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On the basis of a study of an international Buddhist movement, this article 
defines “ethical conversations across borders” – acts of ethical deliberation, 
evaluation or argument that take place in cognisance of multiple ethical regimes 
– and proposes the conditions under which they can take place. Fo Guang Shan, 
described in the first part of the article, is a Buddhist movement that originated 
in Taiwan, but which now has branches around the world. It seeks to promote 
the cultivation of virtue among its members and among other people with which 
it has contact. The teachings of Master Hsing Yun, the movement’s founder, 
advocate two methods through which this project can be realised, “sowing 
seeds of affinity” and “convenience”. The second part of the article generalises 
observations made in relation to Fo Guang Shan and draws the conclusion 
that all “ethical conversations across borders” require two things, namely, the 
identification of similarities or “affinities”, and an account of difference that 
stipulates the units between which the conversation is to be carried on. 
1	 This	paper	is	partly	based	on	fieldwork	conducted	in	London	and	Taiwan	in	2009	and	2010.	
Much	of	that	fieldwork	was	conducted	with	Joanna	Cook	and	in	discussion	with	James	Laidlaw	and	
I am grateful to both for their collaboration. I am also indebted to the ‘Taste of Chan’ collaboratory 
research participants at Fo Guang Shan Temple, in London. I have presented versions of this paper 
to research seminars in the anthropology departments of Cambridge and Durham Universities, 
and I am grateful to both institutions for the invitations and the helpful suggestions that resulted. 
Matei	Candea,	Naor	Ben-Yehoyada,	Nick	Evans,	Caroline	Gatt,	Paolo	Heywood,	James	Laidlaw,	
Hallvard	Lillehammer,	Alice	Wilson,	Hantian	Zhang	and	two	anonymous	reviewers	all	provided	
detailed	comments	on	written	drafts	that	proved	very	helpful	in	clarifying	my	thought.
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Introduction
Ethics across borders
What does transnational or translocal ethics look like? Cosmopolitan open mindedness 
is	all	very	well,	but	once	the	mind	is	open	to	other	ways	of	life,	what	does	it	do	with	them?	
How	does	the	open	mind	apprehend	and	value	the	values	that	are	not	its	own?	Can	it	
do	so	only	by	the	lights	of	a	universal	cosmopolitan	ethic,	or	only	in	relation	to	its	own	
‘local’ values? Or does open mindedness mean not judging, not valuing values at all?
Open	mindedness	is,	of	course,	only	one	way	to	pursue	ethics	in	a	context	of	global	
ethical diversity. What of the missionary, or the colonialist, or the human rights advocate 
–	what	of	 those	convinced	 that	 they	are	 right	about	 some	ethical	questions	and	 that	
others	are	wrong?	Can	such	people	reasonably	believe	that	others	will	come	to	accept	
their	priorities	by	force	of	argument?	And	if	so,	how	is	such	an	argument	to	be	made	
persuasive?
Academic	attempts	 to	explain	 the	diversity	of	moral	 thought	and	practice	 tend	 to	
gravitate	towards	one	of	two	poles	on	a	spectrum	running	from	relativism	to	universalism.	
At one pole, differences in values are interpreted as the result of different processes of 
acculturation	or	socialization,	evidence	of	incommensurable	ways	of	understanding	the	
world	and	human	beings’	place	in	it.	On	this	view,	encounters	across	ethical	difference	
are bound to end in misunderstanding. At the other pole, apparent disagreements about 
values	are	 taken	to	reflect	 the	operation	of	a	universal	moral	or	economic	rationality	
under different circumstances or on divergent economic and political interests. On this 
view,	ethical	discourse	is	so	much	empty	rationalization	intended	to	obscure	the	baser	
motives	 from	 self	 and	 other.	 In	 a	 global	 context,	 the	 implication	 of	 this	 view	 is	 that	
missionaries	and	campaigners	only	do	what	they	do	in	order	to	justify	the	domination	
by	 their	 own	 societies	 of	 others,	 and,	 conversely,	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 values	 of	
powerful	societies	by	members	of	less	powerful	societies	is	nothing	more	than	mimicry	
in bad faith.
	Both	approaches	have	provided	us	with	useful	insights	into	human	motivation	and	
action,	and,	although	their	advocates	sometimes	suggest	otherwise,	we	do	not	need	to	see	
them	as	mutually	exclusive.	Indeed	a	number	of	anthropologists	have	explored	the	ways	
in	which	the	two	can	be	combined	by	studying	how	individual	interest	can	be	–	must	
be	–	expressed	in	forms	that	are	constrained	by	the	structure	of	cultural	knowledge.	
However,	there	is	an	important	dimension	of	ethical	experience	that	occurs	at	the	real	
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and imagined interface of ethical traditions that neither methodological relativism nor 
methodological	universalism,	nor	a	combination	of	the	two	can	accommodate.
What	 is	 needed	 is	 a	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 encounters	with	 ethical	 difference	 in	
which	the	reaction	is	neither	incomprehension,	nor	cynicism,	but	a	genuine	recognition	
of the ethical in the other. The need has made itself apparent to me during the course 
of my research on a contemporary Buddhist movement, Fo Guang Shan. My argument 
is	 that	such	encounters	are	characterised	by	what	 I	call	ethical conversations across 
borders.	(As	the	term	is	rather	unwieldy,	I	will	simply	use	Conversation as a shorthand.) 
Fo Guang Shan
Fo Guang Shan is one of a number of Buddhist organizations that have emerged in 
Taiwan	since	the	end	of	martial	law	in	the	1980s.	Originally	founded	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s	as	a	publishing	business,	and	 later	a	single	 temple,	by	 its	 leader,	Master	Hsing	
Yun,	Fo	Guang	Shan	rapidly	expanded	in	the	1990s	and	soon	became	a	multi-million-
member	association	with	branches	across	the	world.	The	movement	is	run	by	monastics,	
mainly	female,	but	the	key	to	its	growth	and	influence	are	the	lay	members,	who,	as	well	
as	making	regular	cash	donations	and	supporting	specific	fund-raising	campaigns,	also	
pledge	their	time	as	volunteers	to	help	the	organization	run	its	administration,	worship,	
education	programmes	and	social	work	initiatives.	
Fo	Guang	Shan	is	active	in	a	wide	range	of	areas.	It	runs	a	globally	distributed	daily	
newspaper,	 the	 Merit Times, a number of television channels, museums, libraries, 
orphanages and schools, three fully-accredited universities teaching a full range of 
secular	subjects,	and	a	travel	agency.	At	the	end	of	2011,	the	organization	opened	what	it	
claims	is	the	largest	Buddhist	pilgrimage	site	in	the	world,	the	Buddha	Memorial	Centre,	
next	to	the	original	Fo	Guang	Shan	temple	in	Kaohsiung.	
Fo	Guang	Shan	sees	itself	as	a	global	organization,	but	also	as	the	heir	to	a	specifically	
Chinese	tradition	drawn	from	Buddhist	and	Confucian	sources.	It	has	a	very	clear	account	
of	the	ways	in	which	ethical	values	and	practices	from	one	culture	can	appeal	to	people	
of	another,	and	of	the	limitations	under	which	that	process	takes	place.	The	aim	of	Fo	
Guang	Shan	is	to	“sow	seeds	of	affinity”	by	exposing	people	to	the	best	of	Buddhist	and	
Chinese	culture,	and	to	adapt	Buddhist	culture	to	make	it	“convenient”,	so	that	people	
with	different	abilities,	personal	habits,	cultural	backgrounds	and	social	conditions	can	
find	something	that	is	easy	for	them	to	adopt	and	will	help	them	to	lead	better	lives.	At	
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the	same	time,	Fo	Guang	Shan	teaches	that	its	own	ethical	practices	can	be	constantly	
improved and that lessons can and should be learned from other traditions.
This	 active,	 self-conscious	 effort	 to	 reflect	 on	 ethics,	 to	 influence	others	–	others	
defined	by	variously	constituted	borders	of	difference	–	and	to	acquire	ethical	wisdom	
from them, in short to conduct an ethical conversation across borders, makes Fo Guang 
Shan a valuable case study for the development of a more general understanding of 
genuinely transnational ethics.
Ethics
The	term	“ethics”	has	a	wide	variety	of	meanings	in	ordinary	and	technical	usage,	and	
for	this	reason	it	is	necessary	to	say	a	little	about	what	I	mean	when	I	use	the	term.	First,	
to	address	the	question	of	scope,	 for	the	purposes	of	 this	paper,	when	I	use	the	term	
“ethics”	I	am	using	it	in	the	broadest	possible	sense.	That	is	to	say,	I	am	referring	not	
only	to	that	aspect	of	thought	and	action	that	has	to	do	with	rules,	laws,	duties	and	rights	
that	we	easily	think	of	as	ethical	(and	which	some	philosophers	have	distinguished	from	
the	“moral”	in	the	light	of	arguments	first	advanced	by	Elizabeth	Anscombe	1958),	but	
also	 to	questions	of	 character,	 happiness	 and	 even	aesthetics.	Ethics	 as	 I	 use	 it	 here	
takes	in	anything	that	contributes	to	answering	the	Socratic	question,	“How	should	one	
live?”	(Williams	1985,	1;	Laidlaw	2002,	316),	or	any	action	taken	or	proposed	because	“it	
is	presumed	to	be	productive	of	some	objective	good”	(Shweder	2012).
Second,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 of	 normativity,	 let	me	 clarify	 that	 I	 am	using	
“ethical”	 in	a	descriptive	 rather	 than	a	normative	 sense.	Used	descriptively,	 “ethical”	
means	“to	do	with	how	we	ought	to	live”.	Used	normatively,	it	means,	“right”,	or	“good”.	
Consider	the	ancient	Spartan	practice	of	exposing	new-born	infants	to	the	elements	
in	order	that	the	weakest	among	them	should	perish.	We	may	think	this	was	unethical	
behaviour	in	the	normative	sense	(we	think	it	was	wrong).	But	regardless	of	what	we	
think	of	 it,	 to	 the	 extent	 the	Spartans	 adopted	 this	practice	 as	 a	means	of	 achieving	
ends	that	they	thought	were	good,	we	can	agree	that	this	was	an	ethical	practice	in	the	
descriptive	sense.	To	deny	that	it	was	ethical,	in	this	specific,	descriptive	sense,	would	
be	to	claim	that	it	was	done	unthinkingly,	unreflectively,	without	reference	to	a	notion	
of the valuable or the good. Habitual or coerced action could be described as ‘unethical’ 
on those terms.
In	what	follows,	then,	when	I	describe	particular	Fo	Guang	Shan	practices	as	ethical,	
that	can	be	taken	to	mean	that	they	are	designed	with	the	attainment	of	some	good	in	
mind. 
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In	the	first	part	of	the	article,	I	 introduce	the	teachings	of	Fo	Guang	Shan	leader,	
Master	Hsing	Yun,	and	explain	some	of	the	complexities	that	arise	when	putting	these	
teachings into practice. In the second part of the paper, taking the Fo Guang Shan case 
as	a	starting	point,	I	consider	the	question	of	Conversations from a formal or abstract 
point	of	view	and	draw	some	tentative	general	conclusions	about	the	conditions	under	
which	it	might	be	possible	to	speak	ethically	across	borders.	In	a	nutshell,	my	suggestion	
will	be	that	any	party	to	an	ethical	conversation	across	borders	needs	two	things:	(1)	
successful	identification	of	one	or	more	points	of	similarity,	or	affinities, as I call them, 
borrowing	a	term	from	Fo	Guang	Shan	and	(2)	an	account of difference that provides a 
conceptualisation	of	the	borders	across	which	the	conversation	is	taking	place,	and	of	
the	relatively	homogeneous	units	between	which	it	is	carried	on.	
Master Hsing Yun and Fo Guang Shan’s ethical conversations
Fo Guang Shan ethical teachings
Although Fo Guang Shan is a relatively young religious movement, it has developed a 
distinctive body of teachings, mainly in the form of books, pamphlets, journals, speeches 
and videos by the founder and leader of the organization, Master Hsing Yun. These 
have been translated into many languages and disseminated among members and non-
members	through	a	variety	of	channels.	Books	are	sold,	but	also	often	given	away	for	
free.	Many	of	Hsing	Yun’s	writings	and	speeches	are	available	 to	download	 from	the	
internet, and they form the basis of lectures and Dharma talks after services. There is 
a	daily	newspaper,	DVDs	and	even	television	channels.	There	are	short	courses	ending	
in	examinations,	but	there	is	no	attempt	to	enforce	orthodoxy	on	the	membership,	and	
many	members	read	widely	about	Buddhism	and	other	spiritual	traditions.	
Hsing Yun sees Fo Guang Shan Buddhism as heir to Chinese Pure Land Buddhism 
(as	well	as	to	Chan	Buddhism),	but	he	adapts	some	of	the	central	Pure	Land	teachings.	
On	Master	Hsing	Yun’s	telling	of	it,	the	Pure	Land	tradition	teaches	that	this	world	is	
impure, and full of suffering. Under these conditions, humans are distracted by suffering 
to	such	an	extent	that	we	have	no	real	hope	of	learning	from	Buddhist	teachings	and	
reaching	enlightenment	 through	our	own	efforts.	However,	with	 the	help	of	buddhas	
and bodhisattvas, humans can aspire to be reborn in one of a number of Pure Lands, 
where	 the	 Dharma	 is	 preached	 perpetually,	 and	 where,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 pain	 and	
imperfection, everyone can reach enlightenment instantaneously. 
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Master	Hsing	Yun,	in	explicit	contrast	with	traditional	interpretations	of	Pure	Land	
teaching,	 argues	 that	 the	world	 of	 living	human	beings	 is	 not	 irredeemably	 impure,	
only relatively impure. In fact, medical and technological progress have reduced the 
suffering	of	many	human	beings.	There	have	also	been	developments	in	moral	wisdom	
such	 as	 the	 recognition	 of	 human	 equality	 (including	 equality	 of	 the	 sexes)	 and	 the	
increasing international acceptance of the principles of human rights. As a result, Hsing 
Yun	teaches,	our	world	is	becoming	a	better	approximation	of	a	Pure	Land.	As	the	world	
has improved through human effort, so the opportunity and capacity of its inhabitants 
to	cultivate	wisdom	and	virtue	has	increased;	wiser	and	more	virtuous	individuals	will	
contribute	to	purer	societies	and	a	better	world,	 leading	to	a	virtuous	cycle.	In	order	
to promote this cycle, Hsing Yun calls on Buddhists – and everyone else – to cultivate 
virtue in themselves and promote it in others. So although many of the premises of 
Hsing	Yun’s	“Humanistic	Buddhism”,2 as he calls it, are the same as those of traditional 
Pure	Land	 teachings,	 the	orientation	 towards	 the	world	we	 live	 in	 is	quite	different:	
it is broadly optimistic (though recent years have seen Hsing Yun and his monastics 
voice	more	concern	over	growing	global	problems,	especially	environmental	ones)	and	
activist,	rather	than	pessimistic	and	quietist.
Universalism, relativism and pluralism
Master	Hsing	Yun	 teaches	 that	 the	 principles	 of	 compassion	 and	wisdom	according	
to	 which	 the	 world	 is	 to	 be	 improved	 are	 not	mysterious;	 the	 truths	 of	 Buddhism,	
such as impermanence, emptiness and the importance of compassion, are simple 
and	transparent,	accessible	to	everyone,	and	have	probably	been	acknowledged	in	all	
traditions to some degree. What, for him, makes the Buddha and other sages great 
and	worthy	of	devotion	is	not	that	they	attained	esoteric	knowledge	that	eludes	other	
beings, but rather that they achieved a practical mastery that enabled them fully to 
inhabit	virtues	that	most	people	do	know,	but	can	implement	only	imperfectly.
2	 The	 idea	 of	Humanistic	 Buddhism	 or	 Buddhism	 for	 the	 human	world	 is	 found	 in	 slightly	
different	forms	among	various	contemporary	Buddhist	groups	in	Taiwan.	The	basic	idea	can	be	
traced	to	Master	Tai	Xu,	a	modernist	Buddhist	in	the	early	twentieth	century	who	thought	that	a	
reformed Chinese Buddhism could play a role in returning the country to its former greatness, but 
that,	in	order	for	China	to	benefit	from	its	heritage	of	Buddhist	wisdom,	the	focus	would	need	to	
be	shifted	away	from	death	and	the	dead	and	towards	life	and	living	human	beings	(see	Pittman	
2001).	Fo	Guang	Shan	Humanistic	Buddhism	can	also	be	seen	as	a	form	of	‘Engaged	Buddhism’	
(Queen	and	King	1996;	Queen	et	al.	2003)
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This optimism about the accessibility of fundamental moral truths means that 
Fo	Guang	Shan	is	confident	in	its	ability	to	engage	with	and	judge	other	traditions,	
regardless of cultural difference, by applying common human reason to universal 
truth. In this respect, Fo Guang Shan’s ethics is universalist, and Hsing Yun 
frequently	makes	this	claim	explicitly.	“Buddhism	has	always	embodied	universalism,	
the	 concept	 that	 geographic	 limitations	 do	 not	 exist,”	 one	 of	 his	 essays	 explains,	
“Buddhism	belongs	to	the	world	and	to	all	people”	(Hsing	Yun	2010,	33).	“Human	
reason	itself,”	he	writes	in	another,	“is	a	reflection	of	deep	reality.	There	is	but	one	
truth	and	it	applies	equally	to	all	of	us.	No	one	can	stand	above	this	truth,	and	no	one	
can	escape	the	consequences	of	turning	away	from	it”	(Hsing	Yun	2000).
One	way	in	which	he	explains	the	universality	of	Buddhist	truth	is	by	drawing	on	
the Chan Buddhist teaching of universal Buddha nature. So for instance, in his book, 
The Buddha’s Light Philosophy,	he	writes,
After the Buddha attained enlightenment under the bodhi tree, he taught that all 
sentient beings possess Buddha nature, the potential to become a Buddha. . . . From 
this	concept	arises	the	idea	that	all	sentient	beings	are	equal,	and	all	dharma	realms	
are one. These insights are the foundation needed for human beings to reach eternal 
peace,	and	they	provide	guidance	that	can	benefit	the	entire	world.	(Hsing	Yun	2010,	
4)
The	 existence	 of	 this	 truth,	 immanent	 in	 human	 reason,	 and	 realised	 in	 its	
perfection by Sakyamuni Buddha establishes the ethical commensurability of 
different times and places: 
There is one truth for all of us, and this truth is the truth taught by Shakyamuni 
Buddha.	 The	Dharma	 is	 true	 on	 every	 continent	 and	 in	 every	 realm	 of	 existence.	
(Hsing	Yun	2000)
Thus	Hsing	Yun	explicitly	rejects	cultural	relativism,	arguing	that	the	Dharma,	
applies to all because it is an objective truth that cannot be changed by our subjective 
interpretations	of	it.	(2000)
The realisation of the goal of Humanistic Buddhism, the building of a Pure Land 
on	earth,	thus	require	the	propagation	of	the	truths	of	Buddhism	around	the	world	
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so	that	the	lay	wing	of	the	organization,	the	Buddha’s	Light	International	Association	
(BLIA) becomes,
a	true	international	community,	which	transcends	nationality,	ethnicity,	and	tradition.	
(Hsing	Yun	2010,	29)
When	the	Association	was	established,	the	objective	of	spreading	Buddhism	around	
the	world	was	named	by	Hsing	Yun	as	one	of	its	missions,	and	he	often	reminds	members	
of	their	obligation,	saying	for	example:
BLIA members should stand locally and think globally. They should plant bodhi seeds on 
every	continent,	allowing	the	Dharma	to	be	introduced	worldwide.	(Hsing	Yun	2010,	33)
However,	 while	 Hsing	 Yun’s	 ethics	 is	 strongly	 universalist,	 its	 universalism	 is	
complicated	by	the	belief	that	the	eternal	values	that	Buddhism	teaches	never	exist	in	the	
abstract.	They	must	always	be	realised	in	some	particular	form,	conditioned	by	specific	
contingencies of culture, history, and by technological and economic development. 
“Buddhism	is	of	this	world,”	says	Hsing	Yun,	quoting	a	Chan	sutra,	“it	cannot	exist	apart	
from	this	world.”	So	the	task	Fo	Guang	Shan	Buddhists	set	themselves	is	to	find	ever	
more	specific	ways	of	skilfully	embodying	the	virtues	that	Buddhism	teaches,	with	each	
way	being	particularly	appropriate	to	a	specific	form	of	life,	or	attractive	to	a	specific	kind	
of	person.	Traditional	Chinese	culture	succeeds	in	orchestrating	frequent	opportunities	
for	people	to	cultivate	virtue,	but	it	provides	only	one	way	of	doing	that,	appropriate	for	
people	who	have	grown	into	certain	habits	and	who	live	in	certain	historical	societies,	
with	all	of	their	contingent	specificities.	
In a speech addressed to BLIA members, Master Hsing Yun recalled a visit to an 
American university. His academic host, the Master reported, said to him,
You	 are	 welcome	 to	 propagate	 the	 Dharma	 in	 the	 USA.	 But	 it	 seems	 that	 you	 have	
repeatedly	tried	to	impose	your	Chinese	culture	on	the	Americans;	as	if	you	are	trying	to	
subjugate	the	American	culture.	(Hsing	Yun	2004)
Taken	aback,	the	monk	reflected.	“It	became	apparent	to	me,”	he	said,
that	I	have	been	insensitive	to	their	local	cultures.	I	was	reminded	that	the	purpose	of	my	
visit	is	to	contribute	and	serve,	just	as	Buddhist	devotees	make	offerings	of	flowers	to	the	
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Bodhisattvas.	Therefore	we	must	respect	the	cultures	of	other	countries	and	societies;	
and	to	accept	the	unique	characteristics	of	these	cultures.	We	learn	from	the	sutras	that	
the	Eastern	Pure	land	has	its	own	characteristics	which	are	different	from	the	special	
features	of	the	Western	Pure	land.	Similarly,	there	are	differences	between	practicing	
in secluded monasteries and practicing Humanistic Buddhism in society. (Hsing Yun 
2004)
In general, Hsing Yun’s position could be described as a variety of moral pluralism. 
He urges respect for cultural difference, but rejects outright relativism. He defends an 
objective	view	of	morality,	yet	rejects	the	view	that	a	concrete	morality	derived	from	
one	historical	context	could	be	universally	valid	(see	Shweder	2012).
Sowing seeds of affinity and convenience
One	might	wonder	how	the	aims	of	spreading	the	Dharma	and	increasing	virtue	can	be	
squared	with	the	principle	of	respecting	other	cultures.	There	are	two	ways	in	which	
Master	Hsing	Yun	 speaks	 of	 doing	 both.	 The	first	 is	what	 he	 calls	 “sowing	 seeds	 of	
affinity”:	presenting	audiences	with	a	wealth	of	diverse	manifestations	of	virtue,	in	the	
hope	that	some	of	them	will	appeal,	drawing	the	target	into	a	broader	engagement	in	
which	both	sides	can	 learn	about	 skilful	 living	 in	 the	human	world.	Fo	Guang	Shan	
Buddhists	call	this	strategy	“sowing	seeds	of	affinity”.
The	 second	 way	 is	 what	 Hsing	 Yun	 calls	 “convenience”.	 Buddhism	 needs	 to	 be	
adapted,	 or	 made	 “convenient”,	 as	 Fo	 Guang	 Shan	 members	 say,	 so	 that	 it	 can	 be	
accepted	by	people	for	whom	its	traditions	are	alien.	But	the	aim	of	convenience	is	not	
just	to	win	people	over	to	Buddhism.	It	is	also	to	fashion	Buddhist	practices	in	a	way	
that	will	not	prove	disruptive	in	the	new	setting.	Because,	according	to	Fo	Guang	Shan	
teachings,	people’s	relationships	with	friends	and	family	and	with	society	at	large	are	
part	of	the	conditions	upon	which	their	capacity	for	virtue	depends,	the	aim	must	be	
to	find	a	way	of	manifesting	Buddhist	truth	that	enhances	rather	than	damages	those	
relationships. 
The	 flexibility	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 convenience	 might	 be	 mistaken	 for	 a	 form	 of	
encompassment,	in	which	other	traditions	are	approved	in	so	far	as	they	conform	to	the	
greater or higher truth of Fo Guang Shan Buddhism. This position is avoided because 
of	an	implicit	distinction	between	Buddhism	as	Universal	Truth,	and	Fo	Guang	Shan	
Chinese Buddhism as a historical tradition. Truth is unitary, but its manifestations are 
Jonathan Mair
75
numerous,	and	though	Chinese	tradition	may	have	much	to	 teach	the	world,	 it	 is	not	
necessarily	 the	most	perfect	 in	every	respect,	and	where	opportunities	arise,	 it	must	
be adapted to learn from other traditional or innovative ideas and practices. In fact, 
no	tradition,	including	Fo	Guang	Shan’s	own,	is	thought	to	have	a	monopoly	of	virtue	
or	wisdom,	partly	because,	as	societies	interact,	the	conditions	in	which	everyone	has	
to	act	are	changed,	and	opportunities	and	requirements	for	virtuous	life	change	with	
them.	 Ethical	 diversity	 is	 only	 to	 be	 expected	 given	 the	 diversity	 of	 environmental,	
technological	and	social	conditions	to	which	virtue	must	respond.
Thus Fo Guang Shan as an organization aims to learn from other traditions in order 
to adapt to changing circumstances, just as it aims to promote Chinese Buddhism. 
Master Hsing Yun has gone to great lengths to incorporate into his teachings aspects 
of	some	quite	disparate	ethical	traditions.	One	of	the	more	surprising	sources	of	ethical	
inspiration	 on	 which	 Hsing	 Yun	 has	 drawn	 is	 managerial	 capitalism;	 although	 the	
optimism	that	Fo	Guang	Shan	exhibited	in	relation	to	capitalism	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	
has	dimmed	somewhat,	as	concerns	about	consumerism	and	greed	have	entered	into	its	
vocabulary, Master Hsing Yun sees in the modern economy certain principles that are 
consonant	with	the	fundamental	truths	of	Buddhism.
For	 example,	 the	 opportunities	 it	 provides	 for	 advancement	 through	 hard	 work	
encourage	 the	 development	 of	 self-discipline	 and	 focus,	 by	 stimulating	 growth,	 it	
provides	the	wherewithal	necessary	to	relieve	suffering	and	cultivate	wisdom,	and	most	
importantly,	its	emphasis	on	efficiency	promotes	the	acquisition	of	“skilful	means”	by	
which	one’s	goals	can	be	achieved	effectively.	Identifying	these	virtues	in	contemporary	
business culture, Hsing Yun has sought to incorporate some of its practices into Fo 
Guang Shan organization. He has, for instance, encouraged the development of business 
enterprises	under	the	auspices	of	BLIA	in	order	to	generate	funds	with	which	to	fund	
Fo Guang Shan’s activities. Management training culture has also been adopted by the 
movement;	monastics	 are	 required	 to	 take	 regular	 refresher	 courses	 in	management	
and leadership, and some of Fo Guang Shan’s educational institutions teach accredited 
MBA courses. 
In	a	similar	way,	international	human	rights	discourse	has	been	drawn	on	to	modify,	
or	at	least	to	justify	the	modification	of,	traditional	Chinese	Buddhist	practices.	Human	
rights	 culture,	Hsing	 Yun	 argues,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 of	 all	 human	
beings,	which	 is	essential	 to	 the	Chan	Buddhist	doctrine	of	Buddha-nature.	However	
traditional	Buddhism	promoted	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 inequality,	 particularly	 between	men	
and	women;	taking	a	lesson	from	other	traditions,	then,	Fo	Guang	Shan	Buddhism	has	
encouraged	women	to	become	monastics	and	includes	women	among	its	leaders.	
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One of the biggest challenges to Buddhist traditions, according to Master Hsing 
Yun,	is	the	emergence	of	modern	technology,	since	many	established	Buddhist	ways	of	
doing	things	were	the	products	of	technological	limitations	that	no	longer	apply.	Thus,	
as the opportunities have arisen, Fo Guang Shan has embraced broadcast media and 
the internet as channels to communicate its message. The temples have been furnished 
with	the	latest	mod-cons,	including	air	conditioning	in	the	meditation	halls.	Traditional	
limitations	 should	 not	 be	 idealised	 as	 a	 form	 of	 asceticism	 if	 they	 get	 in	 the	way	 of	
achieving	the	goals	of	self	cultivation,	Hsing	Yun	writes,	
With respect to modern technology and culture, all is subject to change and needs to be 
constantly	upgraded.	We	should	apply	Buddhism	in	a	modern	way,	by	adapting	to	current	
changes	and	finding	new	solutions.	This	method	allows	Buddhism	to	remain	the	essence	
and	knowledge	to	be	used	as	a	tool.	(Hsing	Yun	2010,	22)
The	two	principles	of	convenience,	the	adaptation	of	ethical	models	in	order	to	make	
them	 suitable	 for	 an	 individual,	 community	 or	 culture,	 and	 sowing	 seeds	 of	 affinity,	
exhibiting	 virtue	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	 admiration	 and	 draw	 partners	 into	 an	 on-going	
dialogue,	are	frequently	alluded	to	by	Fo	Guang	Shan	monastics	and	devotees.	While	
leaders in the organisation see their role as adapting the tradition to the prevailing 
circumstances,	 they	 do	 not	 simply	 deliver	 the	 adaptations	 to	 their	 followers	without	
comment;	every	localisation	or	reform	is	explained	and	commented	on	in	an	effort	to	
remind	devotees	to	learn	to	adapt	virtuous	practices	to	fit	their	own	lives	in	whatever	
way	they	can.	
Fo Guang Shan ethical conversations across borders in practice
The	 aim	 of	 Fo	Guang	 Shan	 is	 not	 necessarily	 to	 bring	 those	who	 have	 not	 accepted	
Buddhism	 into	 the	 religion	 in	 the	manner	 of	 a	 conversion.	 The	 goal	 is,	 first,	 to	 help	
people	to	live	a	good	life	and,	second,	to	improve	the	state	of	the	world.	As	I	noted	above,	
according	to	the	Fo	Guang	Shan	view	of	things,	these	two	goals	are	mutually	reinforcing	
and	mutually	 limiting.	Those	who,	 for	 example,	 take	up	voluntary	 social	 service,	 are	
thought	both	to	improve	their	own	lives,	and	to	contribute	to	making	the	world	a	better	
place,	 which	 will,	 in	 turn,	 help	 to	 provide	 the	 conditions	 that	 other	 people	 need	 to	
improve themselves.
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There are many factors that can contribute to a good life. The activities that Fo Guang 
Shan undertakes are designed to address one or more of those factors, and the intention 
to	do	this	is	frequently	explicitly	discussed.	Much	of	the	activity	is	conceived	as	being	
educational,	either	directly,	as	is	the	case	with	lectures	and	publications,	or	indirectly,	
as	in	the	case	of	exhibitions	and	concerts	that	are	designed	to	develop	in	the	audience	
an appreciation of beauty. Taken together, these educational activities are described as 
“life	education”.	One	of	the	participants	in	the	London	study,	a	young	professional,	who	
volunteers	and	teaches	regularly	at	the	temple,	explained	why	life	education	is	necessary:
Buddhism	teaches	us	about	the	happiness	of	 life,	which,	 in	turn,	helps	us	to	deal	with	
the	 difficulties	 and	 challenges	 in	 our	 daily	 life.	 Having	 a	 happy	 life	 is	 important	 for	
everyone.	Unfortunately,	the	reality	is	the	school	does	not	teach	us	the	ways	to	achieve	
true happiness.
The	 implementation	 of	 these	 ideas	 is	 complex.	 For	 a	 start,	 Fo	 Guang	 Shan	
Conversations	take	place	over	a	wide	variety	of	borders	of	ethical	difference,	some	of	
which	are	related	to	national	or	cultural	borders,	some	of	which	are	not.	The	methods	
of	sowing	affinities	and	convenience	might	be	used	by	a	nun	to	understand	the	relation	
of Buddhist traditions to the different religious traditions of co-celebrants in an inter-
faith	 service,	 such	as	 the	one	 the	nuns,	or	 “venerables”	 as	devotees	 call	 them,	based	
at the London temple take part in every year under the auspices of the Borough of 
Westminster.	It	equally	provides	a	rationale	for	cooperation	between	different	Buddhist	
traditions, such as the ecumenical Buddhist conferences that Fo Guang Shan organizes 
so	energetically	every	year,	or	between	Mandarin	and	Cantonese	speakers	within	local	
Fo Guang Shan communities. And it can be applied by lay devotees to understand their 
cooperation	with	 other	members,	 or	 to	 guide	 their	 creative	 attempts	 to	 integrate	 Fo	
Guang	Shan	teachings	and	practices	into	their	own	lives.
A	 second	 source	 of	 complexity	 is	 that	 Fo	 Guang	 Shan	 teachings	 emphasise	 the	
importance	 of	 pursuing	multiple	 channels	 of	 communication	with	 various	 audiences	
in	order	to	sow	seeds	of	affinity	that	may	take	root	in	unexpected	ways.	Thus,	Master	
Hsing	Yun	writes:	
There	are	many	ways	that	 lead	sentient	beings	to	the	path.	People	are	not	only	guided	
by Dharma services, but may also be guided through literature, art, books, paintings, 
vegetarian food, or tea. All these can guide people to Buddhism. The BLIA has designed 
various	activities	to	appeal	to	different	people.	Some	examples	are:	Dharma	discussion	
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groups, Dharma protectors’ seminars, meditation classes, and Sunday classes for adults 
and children. . . . Providing a multitude of activities is akin to the methods used by 
Avelokitesvara	Bodhisattva,	who	manifests	 in	a	myriad	of	 forms	 to	 teach	 the	Dharma	
to	each	sentient	being	in	the	best	way.	.	.	.	By	using	loving	kindness	and	compassion	as	
the	foundation	and	skilful	means	as	the	method,	we	emulate	the	spirit	of	Avalokitesvara	
Bodhisattva	who	manifests	in	different	forms,	travels	to	different	lands,	liberates	sentient	
beings,	and	uses	limitless	loving	kindness	and	compassion	with	boundless	skilful	means	
to	teach	the	Dharma.	(Hsing	Yun	2010,	21f)
A	 good	 example	 of	 Fo	 Guang	 Shan’s	 approach	 to	 Conversations is the annual 
International Youth Seminar on Life Education, held at the original Fo Guang Shan 
temple	complex	 in	southern	Taiwan.	This	 is	 just	one	of	 the	more	elaborate	of	a	 large	
number of similar events that Fo Guang Shan temples and branches of the BLIA organize 
around	the	world.	I	attended	the	International	Youth	Seminar	in	the	summer	of	2010,	
when	around	a	thousand	participants	between	the	ages	of	18	and	35	from	some	forty	
countries	 took	part.	The	 largest	 delegations	were	 from	Taiwan,	mainland	China,	 the	
US,	Australia	and	the	Philippines.	Local	temples	around	the	world	(or	Fo	Guang	Shan	
libraries	and	galleries	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Chinese	mainland,	where	 temples	cannot	be	
established	except	by	organizations	that	accept	the	control	of	the	State	Administration	
of Religious Affairs) had advertised for participants and had chosen in most cases a 
mixture	of	devotees,	often	members	of	the	Young	Adult	Division	(YAD)	of	the	BLIA,	and	
sympathetic	 non-Buddhists.	 Some	 of	 the	 non-Buddhists	 I	 spoke	 to	were	 considering	
adopting	 the	religion,	but	many	others	were	committed	members	of	other	 traditions.	
For instance, the large Philippine contingent included an active YAD chapter, but also a 
devoutly Catholic university lecturer. 
The	seminar	took	place	over	ten	days.	Most	of	that	time	was	spent	at	the	Fo	Guang	
Shan	headquarters,	the	main	temple,	in	Kaoshiung	Province	in	the	south	of	Taiwan.	The	
programme	was	intensive.	Days	were	spent	in	a	mixture	of	lectures,	discussion	groups	
and	practical	activities.	Towards	the	end	of	the	seminar	the	participants,	together	with	
their	monastic	 guides,	were	 taken	on	 the	 road	 for	 a	 two-day	 coach	 tour	 that	 took	 in	
Taiwan’s	natural	beauty	spots	and	a	series	of	Fo	Guang	Shan	temples,	culminating	in	a	
closing	ceremony	in	a	large	BLIA	administration	centre	and	temple	complex	in	the	north.	
As	well	as	receiving	certificates	from	Master	Hsing	Yun,	participants	were	greeted	by	
Ma	Ying-Jeou,	President	of	the	Republic	of	China,	a	firm	ally	of	Hsing	Yun.	Throughout	
the	event,	all	costs	regarding	accommodation	and	food	were	borne	by	Fo	Guang	Shan,	
and	there	was	even	a	cash	grant	towards	the	cost	of	travel.	
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The	participants	were	divided	into	groups	of	about	a	dozen	people,	from	a	mixture	
of	countries,	and	each	of	these	groups	was	allocated	one	or	two	monastics	as	guides	for	
the	duration	of	the	seminar.	The	venerable	who	led	my	group,	like	many	of	the	others	
at	Fo	Guang	Shan	headquarters,	held	a	higher	degree	and	had	had	a	very	 successful	
career	before	‘leaving	home’	to	become	a	monastic.	Every	day	began	with	early	morning	
chanting	and	prostrations	in	one	of	the	temples	–	this	was	optional,	as	my	guide	explained	
to	me,	because	it	is	very	difficult	for	young	people	to	get	up	early	in	the	morning.	At	eight	
o’clock	each	morning,	the	participants	were	gathered	for	a	gentle,	coordinated	exercise	
routine,	accompanied	each	day	by	a	short	talk	on	the	importance	of	being	aware	of	one’s	
body	and	exercising	for	health	and	energy.	All	food	was	vegetarian,	and	one	meal	a	day	
was	eaten	with	elaborate	monastic	etiquette,	in	which	the	participants	were	trained.
Lectures	 took	place	 in	 a	 large	 auditorium.	Several	 of	 these	were	 given	by	Master	
Hsing	Yun	himself.	These	dealt	with	aspects	of	Buddhist	theory,	such	as	emptiness,	with	
the	meaning	of	Humanistic	Buddhism,	and	with	the	importance	of	cultivation	and	life	
education	itself.	Most	of	the	other	lectures	were	given	by	Fo	Guang	Shan	venerables	and	
dealt	with	the	Buddhist	perspective	on	life	and	death	(“death	is	the	final	examination,	
we	must	prepare”),	ecology,	art,	and	so	on.	There	was	a	talk	by	the	mountaineer	Jiang	
Xiu	Zhen,	the	first	woman	to	climb	the	world’s	seven	highest	peaks,	who	spoke	about	
her	career,	and	 there	were	dramatic	presentations	and	films,	one	of	which	presented	
the	 life	of	an	ancient	Chinese	physician	who	had	sacrificed	his	 life	 for	the	sake	of	his	
students.	Participants	were	also	given	practical	activities,	such	as	a	meditation	session	
and	 Chinese	 calligraphy,	 and	 tours	 of	 the	 temple	 complex,	 including	 the	 enormous	
Buddha	Memorial	Centre,	which	was	then	under	construction.
At	 least	 twice	 a	 day,	 the	 monastic	 guides	 would	 assemble	 their	 small	 groups	 of	
participants	 to	 ask	 them	 to	 reflect	 on	 and	 discuss	 the	 lectures	 and	 other	 activities	
they	 had	 experienced.	 In	 those	 discussions,	 as	 in	 every	 other	 activity,	 the	 theme	 of	
life	education	was	reiterated.	Although	 it	was	clear	 that	we	were	being	 introduced	 to	
what	our	hosts	saw	as	the	best	of	Fo	Guang	Shan	Buddhist	teachings,	the	emphasis	was	
on	 learning	about	how	to	 live	well,	not	on	accepting	Buddhism	as	a	package.	 In	 fact,	
when	a	number	of	participants,	including	many	of	the	mainland	Chinese	participants,	
asked to take refuge in the Buddha during the camp (effectively to accept conversion to 
Buddhism in a formal ceremony), in the presence of Master Hsing Yun, the monastics 
whom	they	approached	were	at	first	discouraging	and	finally	gently	 refused,	arguing	
that	it	was	more	important	that	they	should	pay	attention	to	the	different	lessons	they	
were	learning,	reflect	on	them	when	they	returned	home	and	put	them	into	practice	as	
best they could.
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A	 similar	multi-channelled	 approach	 is	 adopted	 by	 the	 three	 nuns	 who	 lead	 the	
London	Fo	Guang	Shan	temple.	A	service	of	worship	is	held	at	the	temple	every	week	on	
Sunday	afternoon,	incorporating	chanting	and	prostrations,	followed	by	a	short	talk	by	
the	abbess.	Other	religious	services	are	held	for	specific	festivals,	such	as	Chinese	New	
Year, or the Buddha’s Birthday. Like most Fo Guang Shan institutions, the London temple 
offers a number of courses, including meditation, introduction to Buddhism (students 
study	 the	 writings	 of	 Master	 Hsing	 Yun),	 Chinese	 dancing,	 and	Mandarin	 Chinese,	
and	 there	 is	 a	 “Bodhi	Garden”	 (something	 like	 a	Christian	Sunday	School)	 for	 small	
children. There are occasional lectures by visiting Buddhist leaders. There are cultural 
events,	such	as	tea	ceremonies	and	art	exhibitions.	There	are	many	opportunities	for	
volunteering, either helping in the temple itself by cooking, cleaning or manning the 
small shop and reception, or by visiting old age homes and prisons. The venerables also 
make	frequent	trips	to	local	schools	and	participate	in	inter-faith	services.	
The nuns recognize that certain aspects of the Buddhist and Chinese culture that 
Fo	Guang	Shan	offers	will	appeal	 to	particular	sections	of	 the	population	they	serve.	
Some	embrace	the	devotional	aspects,	for	example,	but	balk	at	the	courses	in	Buddhist	
theory and history, others prefer the reading and study and rarely attend the services 
of	worship.	Many	of	the	people	who	are	drawn	to	the	temple	by	the	meditation	classes	
are	 rather	surprised	 to	 learn	 that	worship	plays	such	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 life	of	
some	Buddhists.	“The	nuns	here	are	excellent	meditation	teachers,”	a	meditator	in	his	
thirties told me, “but the thing is, they have taken Buddhism and they have turned it 
into	a	religion.”	The	nuns	I	have	spoken	to	who	serve	communities	outside	of	Taiwan	
are	acutely	aware	of	cultural	differences	between	different	groups	of	temple	users,	for	
instance,	between	earlier	generations	of	Hakka-	or	Cantonese-speaking	migrants,	and	
more	recently	arrived	Mandarin	speakers,	or	between	the	Chinese	community	and	other	
ethnic	groups.	Rather	than	attempting	to	persuade	their	followers	to	embrace	all	of	these	
activities,	the	venerables	and	lay	teachers	focus	on	providing	them	with	practices	that	
do	appeal	while	taking	every	opportunity	to	prompt	reflection	on	the	opportunities	to	
apply	the	lessons	of	Buddhism	to	cultivate	happiness	and	virtue	in	whatever	other	ways	
might	be	appropriate	to	their	own	lives.
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Issues arising in Conversations
Standards and affinities
Contemplating the many forms that Buddhism has taken in its spread across Asia, an 
the prospect of further adaptation as it spreads to other parts of the globe, the founder 
and	leader	of	Fo	Guang	Shan,	Master	Hsing	Yun	writes,
So	long	as	the	principles	of	the	Dharma	are	not	altered,	we	should	emphasize	and	promote	
the	retention	of	the	local	cultures	and	needs.	(Hsing	Yun	2004)
This statement is easy to understand, but it is clear that to put it into practice 
would	 require	 an	 elaboration	of	 the	distinction	between	 indispensible	moral	 content	
and	merely	contingent	cultural	convention.	That	is	to	say,	one	would	need	to	consider	
specific	 Buddhist	 practices,	 and	 to	 extract	 from	 them	 the	 principles	 that	 justify	
them, disentangling those principles from arbitrary custom that might be abandoned 
altogether and from pragmatic arrangements that are designed to achieve goals that 
might	be	achieved	in	some	other,	equally	or	more	effective	way.	The	same	process	would	
be necessary for any enterprise that sought to apply the principles of some local set 
of	 practices	more	widely.	 It	may	 be	 no	 easy	matter,	 for	 although	 psychologists	 have	
long	held	that	the	distinction	between	moral	rule	and	social	convention	is	innate	and	
universal,	knowing	that	there	is	a	difference	is	not	the	same	as	knowing	where	the	line	
can	be	drawn	that	divides	the	two.
The	problem	is	easier	where	the	rule	is	one	that	we	are	aware	of,	that	is	manifested	
in	legislation,	say,	or	is	self-consciously	celebrated	as	a	local	custom.	However,	many	of	
those	objectified	rules	depend	on	categories	of	thought	or	social	arrangements	or	habits	
that	are	usually	taken	for	granted	and	are	rarely	reflected	upon.	To	a	significant	extent,	
our	moral	lives	are	not	based	on	abstract	principles,	but	on	what	philosopher	J.	E.	Tiles,	
in	his	book	on	cross-cultural	ethics,	developing	a	concept	with	its	roots	in	the	thought	
of	Hegel,	calls	“concrete	moralities”	(2000,	27).	Concrete	moralities	are	something	like	
what	anthropologists	call	‘total	institutions’	in	which	a	whole	way	of	life,	incorporating	
custom, social arrangements and even environmental conditions is implicated in moral 
thought and practice. The problem posed for Conversations by these concrete moralities 
is	that	they	naturalise	the	categories	on	which	ethical	deliberation	depends.	“Most	of	the	
time,”	Tiles	writes,
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people	 live	 within	 their	 concrete	moralities	 as	 comfortably	 (or	 otherwise)	 as	 they	 live	
in their houses or tents, and they do not feel called upon to justify their practices and 
attitudes	or	to	examine	what	if	any	basis	these	might	have.	(Tiles	2000,	74)
Especially	when	we	are	in	familiar	settings	—	in	our	own	tents,	so	to	speak	—	the	
differences	 between	 tradition,	 habit	 and	 pragmatic	 efficiency	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
ethical	considerations	about	value	and	duty	on	 the	other	are	 frequently	omitted	 from	
consideration:	 there	 are	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 given,	 concrete	 ways	 of	 living	 life,	 and	
most	 of	 our	 choices	 will	 be	 made	 from	 among	 them.	 Even	 innovations	 justified	 on	
moral	 grounds	 will	 silently	 incorporate	 much	 that	 is	 conventional.	 But	 when	 people	
speak	 ethically	 across	 borders,	 they	must	 face	 the	 problem	of	 finding	ways	 to	 render	
the	ethics	of	different	regions	commensurate.	They	must	decide	on	a	place	to	draw	the	
line that divides a universal or shared essence from contingent cultural convention, to 
decide	whether	it	is	the	form	of	the	specific	practices	that	are	valued,	or	the	principle	that	
underlies	them,	or	the	goal	to	which	they	contribute.
Tiles	suggests	that	a	common	approach	to	the	resolution	of	this	kind	of	conflict	of	
concrete moralities is to seek a common standard of measurement that can be applied 
to	 competing	 ethical	 considerations.	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 that	 ethical	 conversations	
across	borders	are	always	based	on	finding	this	kind	of	common	standard,	or	point	of	
communication,	which	I	will	call,	after	the	fashion	of	Fo	Guang	Shan	Buddhists,	affinities.	
Tiles	discusses	three	possible	methods	for	arriving	at	a	common	standard	when	facing	
disagreement. They are:
(1) Using reason to move from particular cases to universal abstract principles. Tiles 
takes	the	Socratic	dialectician	as	the	pattern	for	this	approach.	As	a	contemporary	example	
we	might	 take	movements	 such	 as	Karen	Armstrong’s	 Charter	 for	 Compassion,	which	
aims	 to	unite	disparate	 religious	 traditions	 around	 the	Golden	Rule,	which	 supporters	
claim is universal (“The principle of compassion lies at the heart of all religious, ethical 
and	 spiritual	 traditions,	 calling	 us	 always	 to	 treat	 all	 others	 as	we	wish	 to	 be	 treated	
ourselves”).
(2)	Identifying shared exemplary models, against which different ethical considerations 
are to be measured.	Tiles	identifies	this	approach	with	Confucius.	
(3)	Using an empirical approach to determine functions or ends and judging competing 
ethical considerations according to their contribution to achieving those ends. Tiles 
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associates	this	approach	with	Aristotelian	virtue	ethics:	the	thing	is	to	understand	the	
nature	of	man,	and	whether	particular	practices	contribute	to	the	perfection	of	that	nature	
or	 prevent	 it.	More	 recent	 examples	would	 include	 twentieth-century	 state	 socialisms	
that, starting from a theory about the nature of economic relations and the ethically 
positive	trend	of	world	history,	 judged	policies	according	to	whether	they	advanced	or	
retarded the liberation of the Proletariat. 
To	Tiles’	 three	kinds	of	 standard,	 I	 suggest	we	add	several	more	–	 though	 this	 is	
unlikely	to	exhaust	the	possibilities:	
(4) Agreeing on a common meta-ethics.	For	example,	Eugenio	Menegon,	a	scholar	of	the	
Jesuit’s	missions	to	China,	has	argued	that	the	Jesuits	and	the	Confucian	 literati	with	
whom	they	interacted	in	China	were	able	to	admire	in	each	other	an	organic	approach	to	
knowledge,	in	which	the	aspiration	of	scholarship	was	to	reveal	the	connection	between	
physical	and	metaphysical	orders	of	knowledge,	 including	moral	knowledge	(Menegon	
n.d.;	see	also	Mungello	2009,137	f).	
(5) Agreeing on a common enemy.	This	approach,	 like	agreeing	on	shared	exemplars,	
allows	ethical	conversations	to	be	carried	on	in	the	absence	of	agreement	on	or	even	any	
specification	of	underlying	principles.	Mungello	gives	an	example	of	 this	 in	 the	Jesuit	
case:	both	Jesuits	and	Confucian	literati	reviled	Buddhist	monks,	each	side	for	its	own	
reasons	 (2009,	 14).	 For	 a	 contemporary	 example,	 consider	 the	 agreement	 that	 can	be	
reached	 between	 otherwise	 ethically	 divergent	 states	 through	 the	 condemnation	 of	
terrorism and terrorists.
(6) Agreeing on the importance of practices. We can agree on the value of maintaining 
certain	 embedded	 practices,	 such	 as	 forms	 of	 etiquette,	 or	 rituals,	 even	 if	 we	 have	
interpretations	of	them	that	are	quite	contradictory.
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Accounts of difference
In order to engage in a Conversation	one	needs	to	have	 in	mind	two	or	more	ethical	
units.	Neither	the	units,	nor	the	differences	or	borders	that	separate	and	define	them,	
are givens. The borders need not be territorial at all, still less national or regional 
geopolitical ones. Border thinking is not limited to thought about nation states: other 
ways	of	imagining	difference	such	as	galactic	polities,	historical	periods,	world	religions	
(Masuzawa	 2005,	 Cook	 et	 al.	 2009),	 literary	 civilizations	 (Pollock	 1998),	 ethnicities,	
clans	 and	 castes	 all	 produce	 interfaces	 across	 which	 differences	 can	 be	 observed.	
Borders can be complicated and the units they separate may not be divided by the same 
kinds of difference. 
For an empire that sees itself as universal, like the historical Chinese empire, the key 
border	may	be	between	those	inside	the	empire,	and	those	outside	it	(traditional	Chinese	
thought	made	room	for	a	third	category	between	Chinese	subjects	and	‘raw’	barbarians,	
the	 ‘cooked’	 barbarians,	 who	 were	 on	 their	 way	 to	 becoming	 Chinese;	 see	 Fiskesjö	
1999).	 For	 the	 European	 jurists	 who	 developed	 international	 law	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century, one set of borders divided ‘civilized nations’ from each other, another divided 
those	countries	from	‘barbarous’	and	 ‘semi-barbarous’	states;	 legal	arguments	were	a	
proper	way	to	settle	disputes	between	the	powerful	European	and	Anglophone	states,	
but	force,	not	persuasion,	was	appropriate	in	dealing	with	the	less	developed	countries	
(Orakhelashvili	2006).
For	the	border	to	be	meaningful,	 it	will	need	to	separate	units	of	relative	internal	
homogeneity,	but	it	is	not	important	whether	the	border	or	the	homogeneity	on	either	
side	of	it	is	real.	The	point	is	that	when	people	engage	in	ethical	deliberation	in	the	form	
of a Conversation, the form their deliberation takes is dependent on their accounts of 
difference.
In the case of Fo Guang Shan Conversations, it is clear that no one set of borders 
takes priority. Fo Guang Shan addresses a number of different groups of outsiders 
across	borders	 it	 conceives:	non-Buddhists	 in	Taiwan,	mainlanders	across	 the	Strait,	
westerners	in	general	across	the	border	of	East/West	cultural	difference,	 followers	of	
other forms of Buddhism, and of other, non-Buddhist religious traditions. Particularly 
important	is	the	border	between	traditional	Chinese	and	modern	culture,	as	understood	
by Master Hsing Yun, because it is the Conversation carried out across that divide that 
explains	and	justifies	most	of	the	innovations	that	distinguish	Fo	Guang	Shan	practice	
from its Chinese Buddhist antecedents.
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However,	though	the	borders	involved	in	Fo	Guang	Shan	Conversations are diverse, 
they	are	united	by	a	common	and	specific	account	of	difference:	the	view	that	ethical	
differences are due to differences in culture, and that cultures are in part the result of 
more or less successful attempts to adapt virtue to prevailing circumstances.
Conversation partners
Conversations,	as	I	have	described	them,	make	possible	at	least	two	distinct	roles	for	
interlocutors.	The	first	is	the	role	of	interlocutor	as	a	bearer	of	values.	The	second	role	
is	the	role	of	 interlocutor	as	an	addressee.	In	the	first	sense,	when	Master	Hsing	Yun	
speaks	to	his	followers	of	capitalism	and	management	culture	as	being	a	source	of	moral	
values	with	which	Buddhist	values	can	be	compared,	both	units	are	serving	as	bearers	
of values – Buddhist values and business values are being simultaneously distinguished 
and	 juxtaposed	 in	Master	 Hsing	 Yun’s	 ethical	 reasoning.	 However,	 the	 lessons	 that	
Hsing	Yun	draws	 from	the	Conversation	 are	 intended	 for	Fo	Guang	Shan;	Fo	Guang	
Shan members, as Buddhists, rather than as business people, are the addressees of the 
deliberation. 
One can think of many Conversations that take this form: deliberations carried on 
by	parties	who,	 though	they	may	disagree	with	one	another,	see	 themselves	as	being	
on	the	same	side	of	a	border,	separated	by	ethical	difference	from	a	party	who	is	not	
present.	This	 is	 the	case	 in	cultural	 renaissances,	 in	which	 thinkers	attempt	 to	draw	
moral	lessons	for	their	contemporaries	from	ancient	authors	who	lie	beyond	the	border	
of	temporal	disjunction	(Goody	2009).	The	widely	read	anthropologist	Margaret	Mead	
famously	drew	ethical	lessons	from	the	Samoan	islanders	whom	she	had	studied.	In	so	
far	as	her	reasoning	depended	on	the	acknowledgement	of	ethical	difference	between	
Samoans	and	Americans,	her	work	constitutes	a	Conversation in my sense, even though 
her	intended	audience,	her	compatriots,	were	situated	on	the	same	side	of	the	border	
defined	by	that	difference	(Mead	1928).
In	 the	 case	 of	 Fo	Guang	Shan,	 the	purpose	 of	 the	 conversation	 is	 partly	 to	draw	
people together: not all Conversations will	have	such	an	amicable	goal.	The	aim	of	a	
Conversation may be to reach an amicable understanding as a basis for cooperation, or 
to	find	things	to	admire	in	an	unfamiliar	way	of	life,	but	it	may	also	be	to	persuade,	to	
condemn	or	to	shame.	In	order	to	disagree	effectively	with	an	enemy,	it	may	be	necessary	
to	find	a	shared	value	about	which	to	wrangle.	
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There	 are	 well	 attested	 examples	 of	 this	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Christian	 missionary	
activity: in many cases the subjects of the missionaries’ attentions accepted prescriptions 
about	what	a	proper	religion	would	look	like	but	turned	the	values	they	learnt	against	
Christianity	and	claimed	that	their	own	traditions	were	superior	religions,	on Christian 
terms;	 they	were,	as	Ludek	Broz	puts	 it,	 in	 the	context	of	an	article	about	religion	 in	
the Altai Republic, converted to religion – as a moral category – but not to Christianity 
(2009;	 see	Masuzawa	 2005	 for	 an	 argument	 that	 similar	 processes	were	 at	 work	 in	
the	 emergence	of	 the	 category	of	 ‘world	 religion’	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century).	Perhaps	
the	most	well	known	case	of	this	kind	is	the	refiguring	of	Sri	Lankan	Buddhism	as	a	
form of rationalist philosophy described by Gombrich and Obeyesekere in Buddhism 
Transformed	 (1988).	 They	 relate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 reformers	 such	 as	 Anagarika	
Dharmapala	 (1864–1933),	having	been	 trained	 in	English	missionary	 schools	 to	 look	
down	on	Buddhism	as	an	 idolatrous	and	 therefore	 superstitious	 faith,	 rejected	many	
of the traditions of Buddhism as perversions of the Buddha’s teachings on just those 
grounds,	but	reasserted	an	atheistic	and	philosophical	core	that	they	claimed	was	more	
rational and modern than the Christianity of the colonizers. 
Conclusions
The	aim	of	this	article	has	been	to	explore	a	particular	kind	of	ethical	deliberation,	which	
I have called ethical conversations across borders, or simply Conversations. I have 
argued that Conversations	 succeed	 in	overcoming	 the	 conflict	between	universalism	
and relativism by elaborating accounts of difference	that	distinguish	two	or	more	ethical	
units,	while	simultaneously	 identifying	one	or	more	similarities	or	affinities	between	
the parties.
I introduced Fo Guang Shan, an organization that places a particularly heavy 
emphasis on the importance of Conversations,	 and	 explained	 how	 it	 mobilizes	
concepts	of	affinity	and	difference	in	its	teachings	and	in	its	practice.	Fo	Guang	Shan	
Conversations	are	based	on	an	account	of	difference	that	sees	the	human	world	divided	
into cultures at various scales, from the global, through the national, to the local or even 
the individual. Each culture is seen as a more or less successful attempt to adapt culture 
to local conditions.
The	affinities	deployed	in	Fo	Guang	Shan	Conversations in order to bridge the border 
of	cultural	difference	vary	depending	on	context.	In	teachings	about	the	importance	of	
engaging	with	ethical	difference,	Master	Hsing	Yun	stresses	affinities	at	a	high	level	of	
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abstraction:	values	such	as	equality,	freedom	from	suffering	and	wisdom.	Fo	Guang	Shan	
monastics and lay devotees tend to put the mission of speaking ethically across borders 
into practice by relying on more concrete goods such as musical and artistic skill, taste and 
comfort. Fo Guang Shan Conversations are sometimes aimed at adapting practices from 
one	ethical	culture	for	use	in	another,	on	the	principle	of	“convenience”.	Sometimes	the	
objective	is	to	“sow	seeds	of	affinity”	by	exhibiting	a	concrete	manifestation	of	universal	
values	in	order	to	draw	others	into	a	long-term	dialogue	in	which	mutual	learning	and	
adaptation can take place. 
The	phenomena	that	I	discuss	in	this	article	in	relation	to	a	specific	religious	movement	
must	be	ubiquitous,	among	other	religious	groups,	but	also	in	many	other	non-religious	
contexts.	Existing	social	scientific	models	of	transcultural	ethics	attempt	to	understand	
the nature of cultures, or of the universal characteristics of ethical thought that transcend 
cultural	difference.	What	the	Fo	Guang	Shan	case	shows	is	that	the	actors’	own	models	of	
difference	and	similarity	define	the	shape	that	ethical	conversations	across	borders	will	
take.	Understanding	this	is	more	important	than	ever	at	a	time	when,	in	Europe	at	least,	
well	established	paradigms	for	understanding	the	interaction	and	coexistence	of	cultures	
have	been	thrown	into	question.
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